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Wireless sensor networks are a collection of a number of tiny, low-cost, and resource-constrained sensor nodeswhich are commonly
not tamper proof. As a result, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are prone to awide variety of physical attacks. In this paper, we deem
a typical threat known as node replication attack or clone node attack, where an adversary creates its own low-cost sensor nodes
called clone nodes andmisinforms the network to acknowledge them as legitimate nodes. To instigate this attack, an adversary only
needs to physically capture one node, and after collecting all secret credentials (ID, cryptographic keys, etc.), an adversary replicates
the sensor node and deploys one or more clones of the compromised node into the network at strategic positions, damaging the
whole network by carrying outmany internal attacks. Detecting the node replication attack has become an imperative research topic
in sensor network security, and designing detection schemes against node replication attack involves different threatening issues
and challenges. In this survey, we have classified the existing detection schemes and comprehensively explore various proposals in
each category. We will also take a glance at some technical details and comparisons so as to demonstrate limitations of the existent
detections as well as effective contributions.
1. Introduction
Advancement in technology has made it possible to develop
tiny low-cost sensor nodes with off-the-shelf hardware. A
wireless sensor network (WSN), which is a distributed and
self-organized network, is a collection of such sensor nodes
with limited resources that collaborate in order to achieve
a common goal. These sensor nodes are comprised of low-
cost hardware components with constraints on battery life,
memory size, and computation capabilities [1]. Wireless
sensor networks are often deployed in harsh and hostile envi-
ronments which are inaccessible and even hazardous areas
to perform various monitoring tasks. For example, they can
be used to monitor factory instrumentation, pollution levels,
freeway traffic, and the structural integrity of buildings [2].
Some of the other applications of WSNs include patient
monitoring, climate sensing, control in office buildings, and
home environmental sensing systems for temperature light,
moisture, and motion.
WSNs are viable solutions for a wide variety of real-world
challenges; however, a set of new security challenges arise in
sensor networks due to the fact that current sensor nodes lack
hardware support for tamper-resistance (because it is uneco-
nomical to enclose each node in a tamper resistant hard-
ware) and are often deployed in unattended environments
where they are vulnerable to capture and compromise by an
adversary. Taking an example of a battlefield, WSNs must
tackle the threats and attacks from attackers because these
areas are sometimes physically accessible to camouflaged
enemies [3] who would like to acquire the private locations
of soldiers from or inject wrong commands into the sensor
network [4]. Similarly, an unattended WSN can be deployed
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in hostile environments which imply the existence of an
adversary. For example, WSN can be used to monitor firearm
discharge, illicit crop cultivation, drug/weapons smuggling,
human trafficking, nuclear emissions in a rogue region and
other illegal activities [5]. Thus, it is very important to ensure
the security of sensor networks in such scenarios.
The unattended nature of wireless sensor networks can be
exploited by adversaries which are able to launch an array of
different physical attacks including node replication attack,
signal or radio jamming, denial of service (DoS) attack, node
outage, eavesdropping, and Sybil attack. and other attacks
like sinkhole, wormhole, and selective forwarding attack.
Threats to sensor networks can be either layer dependent
or layer independent. Attacks in the former category can be
application dependant and are specific to different OSI layers
targeting specific network functionalities such as routing,
node localization, time synchronization, and data aggrega-
tion, while the attacks in the latter category are application
independent affecting a wide variety of applications from
object tracking and fire alarming to battlefield surveillance,
and these attacks are not launched on any OSI layer. The
attacks of the latter category are also application independent
[2]. This attack taxonomy is also shown in Figure 1. In order
to protect wireless sensor networks from layer dependent
attacks, many schemes have been proposed. To alleviate the
effects of routing disruption attacks, secure routing schemes
have been proposed [6, 7]. Authentication schemes [8–10] are
used to mitigate false data injection attacks. Data aggregation
can be secured by using secure data aggregation protocols
proposed in [11–14]. To defend localization and time synchro-
nization protocols from different attacks, and threats many
protocols have been proposed in [15–21]. Nevertheless, most
of these schemes are attack resilient, rather than they can
detect and remove the source of attack. Thus, there is a need
to detect and revoke the sources of attacks as soon as possible
to substantially reduce the costs and damages incurred by
employing attack resilient approaches.
In this comprehensive survey, we consider a very severe
and important physical attack on WSN which is called node
replication attack or clone attack. It is also known as identity
attack. In this attack, an adversary first physically captures
only one or few of legitimate nodes, then clones or replicates
them fabricating those replicas having the same identity (ID)
with the captured node, and finally deploys a capricious num-
ber of clones throughout the network. This whole process
of node replication attack and the various stages are shown
in Figure 2. This vexing problem arises from the actuality
that sensor nodes are unshielded. It is stated in [22] that an
experienced attacker can completely compromise a typical
sensor node by using only a few readily available tools, and
it can then obtain copies of that node memory and data
within 1min of discovering it. The clones or replicas may
even be selectively reprogrammed to subvert the network by
launching further insider attacks like falsifying sensor data or
suppressing legitimate data, extracting data from the network
and disconnect the network by triggering correct execution
of node revocation protocols that rely on threshold voting
schemes and staging denial of service (DoS) attacks. Clone
nodes may create a black hole, initiate a wormhole attack
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attacks
Routing attacks Node replication
attacks
Data aggregation
attacks
attacks
Sybil attacks
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Time synchronization
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Figure 1: Classification of attacks on wireless sensor networks.
with a collaborating adversary, or may also leak data in an
environment in which sensed data must be kept private [23].
If these replicated nodes or clones remain undetected or
unattended for a long time, they can further commence the
changes in protocol behavior and intrusion into the systems
security [24]. It is easy for an adversary to launch such attacks
due to the fact that the clones, created by an adversary, have
legitimate information (codes, key materials, and creden-
tials), and they may be considered as legitimate nodes and
totally honest by its neighbors which are participating in the
network operation in the same way as the noncompromised
nodes.
The above mentioned traditional security schemes for
WSNs are inept to detect and prevent node replication attack.
Thus, in the last few years, a number of detection and pre-
vention techniques/schemes have been proposed in the liter-
ature. According to [2], the detection schemes are classified
on a high level as network-based or radio-based detection.
Only one instance of radio-based detection is found in [25].
The former category is further categorized into two types as
for mobile WSNs and for stationary WSNs. Both techniques
for mobile and stationary WSNs are further divided into two
broad categories, namely, centralized and distributed. This
can be summarizedwith Figure 3which shows a detailed clas-
sification of all replica detection schemes.This categorization
provides a first step to better understand the node replication
detection schemes.
A WSN can be either stationary or mobile. In static
wireless sensor networks (SWSNs), the sensor nodes are
stationary or static; that is, the sensor nodes are deployed ran-
domly, and after deployment their positions do not change.
On the other hand, in mobile wireless sensor networks
(MWSNs), the sensor nodes canmove on their own, and after
deployment, they can interact with the physical environment
by controlling their own movement. Advances in robotics
have made it possible to develop such mobile sensors which
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Step 1: Sensor Nodes Deployed in Field
Step 2: Capture one sensor node physically                                          Step 5: Deploy these clones at strategic positions
Step 3: Collects all secret credentials
Step 4: Replicate or make clones of captured nodes
Figure 2: Steps of node replication attack.
are autonomous and have the ability to sense, compute,
and communicate like static sensors. The prime difference
between static and mobile WSNs is that mobile nodes are
able to reposition and organize themselves in the network,
and after initial deployment, the nodes spread out to gather
information [26, 27]. Mobile nodes can communicate with
one another when they are within the range of each other,
and only then they can exchange their information gathered
by them. Another important difference is that in static WSNs
fixed routing or flooding is used for data distribution, while
in mobile WSNs dynamic routing is used. As static and
mobile WSNs differ in their characteristics hence replication
detection schemes for stationary and mobile WSNs will be
substantially different. In a static or stationaryWSN, a sensor
node has a unique deployment position, and thus if one
logical node ID is found to be associated with two or more
physical locations, node replication is detected. But this is
inapplicable tomobileWSNs where sensor nodes keep roam-
ing in the deployment field. So, replication detection in such
mobile WSN involves different scenarios and techniques.
For mobile WSNs, both centralized and distributed
techniques have been proposed in the literature. In the
case of stationary WSNs, centralized techniques are further
categorized into five types, namely, straightforward base
station-based technique, key usage-based technique, SET
operations techniques, cluster head-based techniques and
neighborhood social signature-based techniques. The dis-
tributed techniques for stationary WSNs are further divided
into four types naming Node to Network Broadcasting,
claimer-reporter-witness-based techniques, neighbor-based
and generation- or group-based techniques. On the other
hand, mobile centralized detection techniques are further
divided into two types including key usage-based and node
speed-based techniques. The mobile distributed detection
techniques are divided into three main types, namely, node
meeting-based, mobility-assisted-based, and information-
exchange-based techniques.This inclusive categorization can
be summarized with Figure 3 which provides a first step in
better understanding node replication detection schemes.
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Figure 3: Taxonomy of replica detection schemes.
1.1. Motivation. With the rapid use of vast technologies in
WSNs, the threats and attacks to WSN are escalating and are
also being diversified and deliberate. A typical threat called
node replication attack is a very severe and niggling problem
inwhich an adversary replicates a sensor node after physically
capturing it and then uses these replicas to disrupt the net-
work operations by redeploying them at strategic positions
of the network. Thus the research related to node replication
attack in WSNs has been followed with much interest in
recent years. The research of authentication and security
techniques is already quite mature but such solutions fail to
detect node replication attack and thus no longer provide
WSN with adequate security from this attack. Furthermore,
the detection of node replication attack in mobile WSN is far
different and more challenging than in static WSNs.
The development of replica/clone detection techniques
suitable for static WSNs and mobile WSNs is therefore
regarded as an essential research area which will make WSN
(either static or mobile) to be more secure and reliable. Most
recently, Zhu et al. [2] did a survey on the countermeasures of
node replication attack which has pointed out some valuable
technical weaknesses and advantages of some of the tech-
niques, but latest progress of replica detection schemes is
absent, and it also lacks the detailed analysis of all existing
techniques for mobile WSNs.
This motivates us to present our paper as a complete
guideline of replica/clone detection schemes both for static
andmobileWSNs. Moreover, in this paper we have identified
the advantages and shortcomings of all the techniques/
schemes. Finally, some variations of node replication attack
are also identified and discussed. This paper is helpful in
understanding all the replica detection schemes developed
so far, and it can assist the researchers and developers in the
development of new, robust, and effective detection schemes.
1.2. General AdversaryModel. Conventionally, some assump-
tions are made about an adversary in order to scrutinize
security of a sensor network. First of all, an adversary is a
smart and powerful attacker who can launch a clone attack
[4], and it has the ability to secretly capture a limited number
of legitimate sensor nodes [28]. Secondly, an adversary can
create replicas by using cryptographic information which
is obtained from the compromised node. An adversary has
also full control over the compromised and replicated nodes
and can communicate with them at any time. Thirdly, the
main goal of an adversary is to protect its replicas from
being detected by the detection protocol used in the network
because if any replicas are detected, besides starting a revoke
process to revoke replicas, the network may start a sweeping
process to sweep out [29] the compromised node and may
also drawhuman intervention.Thus, it ismostly assumed that
nodes controlled by an adversary still follow the replica detec-
tion protocol as an adversary always wants to be overlooked.
Fourthly, an adversary is so powerful that it is able to subvert
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the nodes thatwill possibly act aswitnesses. To copewith such
an adversary, it could be possible to assume that nodes are
tamper-proof. But as tamper proof hardware is expensive and
energy demanding, a large part of the literature has assumed
that nodes in the network are not tamper resistant.
In case of mobile WSNs, the method of attack is the same
but difference is that an adversary is mobile. The scenario of
mobileWSN is that the sensors are unable to transmit sensed
data at their will because the sink is not always present.
Thus, the data accumulated in theirmemories become targets
of many adversaries. In [30], a mobile adversary model is
proposed in whichmobile adversary visits and travels around
the network trying to compromise a subset of sensors within
the time interval when sinks are not present in the network.
The time taken by a mobile adversary to compromise a set of
sensors is much shorter than the time between two successive
data collections of a sink.
1.3. Node Replication Attack and Its Effects on the Security
Goals of WSNs. High level security issues are basically iden-
tical to the security requirements of both static and mobile
WSNs. Thus, when dealing with security of WSNs, one is
faced with achieving some of the following common security
goals including availability, authenticity, confidentiality, and
data integrity. When node replication attack is launched by
an adversary, all of these security goals are affected severely
because of two reasons. First, if any proper, specific, and
efficient detection scheme is not used to identify and revoke
these replicas because the existing general purpose security
protocols would allow the replica nodes to encrypt, decrypt,
and authenticate all of their communications as if they
were original captured nodes. Second, when the detec-
tion probability of the detection technique used is very low
to detect these clones or replicas. Node replication attack is
significantly harmful to the networks because these replicas
or clones have legitimate keys, and they are recognized as
legitimate members of the network, since they carry all
cryptographicmaterials extracted from the captured nodes so
that an adversary can use them to mount a variety of insider
attacks [2]; for example, it can monitor all the information
passing through the nodes or monitor significant fraction
of the network traffic that passes through the nodes, falsify
sensor data, launch denial of service (DoS) attack, extract
data from the network, inject false data to corrupt the sensor’s
monitoring operation, subvert data aggregation, and jam
legitimate signals and can also cause continual disruption
to network operations by undermining common network
protocols.
Availability ensures the survivability of network services
despite attacks [31]. In case of node replication attack, an
adversary is able to compromise the availability of WSN by
launching a denial of service (DoS) attack, which can severely
hinder the network’s ability to continue its processing. By
jamming legitimate signals, the availability of the network
assets to authorized parties is also affected.
Authenticity is a security goal that enables a node to
ensure the identity of the sensor node it is communicating
with. In case of node replication attack, an adversary creates
clone nodes which are seemingly legitimate ones (identical
to the original captured node) as they have all the secret
credentials of the captured node; thus, it is difficult for any
node to differentiate between a clone node and the original or
legitimate node. Also the existing authentication techniques
cannot detect clone nodes as they all hold legitimate keys.
This is how the authenticity of the network is affected.
Confidentiality is the assurance that sensitive data is being
accessed and viewed only by those who are authorized to see
it. But when node replication attack is launched, confiden-
tiality of data is not assured as clone nodes are the duplicated
nodes of the compromised ones, and thus they behave like
original compromised nodes. These clone nodes can have all
the data that contains trade secrets for commercial business,
secret classified government information, or private medical
or financial records, and thus by misusing such sensitive
data, it can damage the network or organization, person, and
governmental body.
Data integrity ensures that the contents of data or cor-
respondences are preserved and remain unharmed during
the transmission from sender to receiver. Integrity represents
that there is a guarantee that a message sent is the message
received meaning that it was not altered either intentionally
or unintentionally during transmission. But in case of node
replication attack, an adversary can falsify sensor data or
can inject false data to corrupt the sensitive data and thus
subverting the data aggregation using the replicated or clone
nodes.
1.4. Evaluation Metrics for Replication Detection Techniques.
For the performance analysis and evaluation of replica
detection protocols, four vital evaluation metrics are mostly
used by all the detection schemes. These are communication
overhead, storage ormemory overhead, detection probability
and detection time [26].
Communication overhead is defined as the average num-
ber of messages sent by a sensor node while propagating the
location claims. Storage overhead defines the average number
of the location claims stored in a sensor node. Detection
probability is an important evaluation metric which shows
how accurately a protocol can identify and detect the clones
or replicas. The detection time is simply the delay between
actual replica node deployment and detection.
To make the current survey more comprehensive and
detailed, here in Section 2 we have discussed all the existing
schemes for the replica detection in stationary WSNs which
are accordingly compared in Section 3. Section 4 describes all
the replication detection schemes in mobile WSNs proposed
so far in the literature which are then compared in Section 5.
In Section 6, we have highlighted some important issues and
challenges associated with the node replication attack in both
static and mobile WSNs. Finally, Section 7 concludes the
paper.
2. Detection Techniques for Stationary WSNs
Many techniques have been proposed for the detection of
node replication attack in static WSNs which are categorized
mainly into two types as centralized and distributed tech-
niques.
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2.1. Centralized Techniques. In centralized techniques base
station is considered to be a powerful central which is respon-
sible for information convergence and decision making.
During the detection process every node in the network sends
its location claim (ID, Location Info) to base station (sink
node) through its neighboring nodes. Upon receiving the
entire location claims, the base station checks the node IDs
along their location, and if it finds two different locationswith
the same ID, it raises a clone node alarm.
2.1.1. On the Detection of Clones in Sensor Networks Using
Random Key Predistribution. This technique falls into the
category of key usage based techniques. Brooks et al. [32] have
proposed a cloned key detection protocol in the context of
random key predistribution [33]. The basic idea is that the
keys employed according to the random key predistribution
scheme should follow a certain pattern, and those keys whose
usage exceeds a threshold can be judged to be cloned. In the
protocol, counting Bloom filters is used to collect key usage
statistics. Each nodemakes a counting Bloomfilter of the keys
it uses to communicate with neighboring nodes. It appends
a random number (nonce) to the Bloom filter and encrypts
the result using base station public key; this encrypted data
structure is forwarded to base station. Base station decrypts
the Bloom filters it receives, discards duplicates, and counts
the number of time each key used in the network. Keys used
above a threshold value are considered cloned. Base station
makes a bloom filter from the cloned keys, encrypts the list
using its secret key and broadcasts this filter to the sensor
network using a gossip protocol. Each node decrypts base
stations bloomfilter removes cloned keys from its keying, and
terminates connections using cloned keys.
2.1.2. SET: Detecting Node Clones in Sensor Networks. This
technique falls into the category of base station-based tech-
niques. Choi et al. [23] have proposed a clone detection
approach in sensor networks called SET. In SET, the network
is randomly divided into exclusive subsets. Each of the subsets
has a subset leader, and members are one hop away from
their subset leader. Multiple roots are randomly decided to
construct multiple subtrees, and each subset is a node of
the subtree. Each subset leader collects member information
and forwards it to the root of the subtree. The intersection
operation is performed on each root of the subtree to detect
replicated nodes. If the intersection of all subsets of a subtree
is empty, there are no clone nodes in this subtree. In the final
stage, each root forwards its report to the base station (BS).
The BS detects the clone nodes by computing the intersection
of any two received subtrees. SET detects clone nodes by
sending node information to the BS from subset leader to the
root node of a randomly constructed subtree and then to the
BS.
2.1.3. Real-Time Detection of Clone Attacks in Wireless Sen-
sor Networks. This technique falls into the category of
neighborhood social signature-based techniques. Xing et al.
[34] have proposed real-time detection of clone attacks in
WSN. In their approach, each sensor computes a fingerprint
by incorporating the neighborhood information through a
superimposed s-disjunct code [35]. Each node stores the
fingerprint of all neighbors. Whenever a node sends a
message, the fingerprint should be included in the message,
and thus neighbors can verify the fingerprint. The messages
sent by clone nodes deployed in other locations will be
detected and dropped since the fingerprint does not belong
to the same “community.” The motivation behind their
scheme for detection of clone attacks is exploring the social
characteristics of each sensor. Once they are deployed, these
sensors reside within a fixed neighborhood. The sensor and
its neighborhood form a small “community,” or a “social
network.” A cloned sensor can have the same legitimate
credentials (ID, keys, etc.) as the original node, but cannot
have the same community neighborhood. Thus, each sensor
can be distinguishably characterized by its social community
network. In a small community, a newcomer can be easily
recognized if speaking with a different accent. Similarly, a
clone node can be easily identified by its neighbors if carrying
a “social signature” belonging to a different community.
2.1.4. Hierarchical Node Replication Attacks Detection inWire-
less Sensor Networks. This technique falls into the category
of cluster head-based techniques. Znaidi et al. [36] have pro-
posed a cluster head selection-based hierarchical distributed
algorithm for detecting node replication attacks using a
Bloom filter mechanism including the network reactions.
More precisely, the algorithm relies on a cluster head selection
performed using the local negotiated clustering algorithm
(LNCA) protocol [37]. Each cluster head exchanges themem-
ber node Ids through a Bloom filter with the other cluster
heads to detect eventual node replications. The algorithm
works in three steps. In the first step all the material required
for Bloom filter computations and for cryptographic opera-
tions that will be performed in the network predistributed
in each sensor node. The second step performs the cluster
head election. In the third step, Bloom filter construction
is performed by each cluster head, and the Bloom filter
verification is performed by the other cluster heads.
2.1.5. CSI: Compressed Sensing-Based Clone Identification in
Sensor Networks. This technique falls into the category of
base station-based techniques. Yu et al. [38] have proposed
a centralized technique called compressed sensing-based
clone identification (CSI) for static wireless sensor networks.
The basic idea behind CSI is that each node broadcasts
a fixed sensed data (𝛼) to its one hop neighbors. Sensor
nodes forward and aggregate the received numbers from
descendant nodes along the aggregation tree via compressed
sensing-based data gathering techniques. Base station (BS), as
the root of the aggregation tree, receives the aggregated result
and recovers the sensed data of the network. According to
the reconstructed result, the node with the sensory reading
greater than 𝛼 is the clone since a nonclone node can only
report the number once.
2.2. Distributed Techniques. In distributed techniques, no
central authority exists, and special detection mechanism
called claimer-reporter-witness is provided in which the
detection is performed by locally distributed node sending
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the location claim not to the base station (sink) but to a ran-
domly selected node called witness node. Distributed tech-
niques are classified into four types and these are described
below.
2.2.1. Node-to-Network Broadcasting (N2NB) and Determinis-
tic Multicast (DM). This technique falls into the category of
node-to-network broadcasting.TheN2NB andDMprotocols
are two unappealing examples proposed by Parno et al. [28].
Both of protocols received relatively less attention. In N2NB,
each node floods the entire network with authenticated
broadcast to claim its own location (instead of its neighbors).
Each node stores the location information for its neighbors,
incurring a storage cost of 𝑂(𝑑). Each node upon receiving a
conflicting claim invokes a revocation procedure against the
offending nodes, and eventually any replica will be cut off by
all its neighbors (thus isolated from the WSN). The N2NB
protocol achieves 100% detection rate as long as the broadcast
reaches every node if the network size is assumed to be 𝑛 and
certain duplicate suppression algorithm is employed so that
each node only broadcasts a given message once.
The DM protocol is a good example to illustrate the
claimer-reporter-witness framework. The claimer is a node
which locally broadcasts its location claim to its neighbors,
eachneighbor serving as a reporter, and employs a function to
map the claimer ID to a witness. Then the neighbor forwards
the claim to the witness, which will receive two different
location claims for the same node ID if the adversary has
replicated a node. One problem can occur that the adversary
can also employ the function to know about the witness for a
given claimer ID, andmay locate and compromise thewitness
node before the adversary inserts the replicas into the WSN
so as to evade the detection.
2.2.2. Distributed Detection of Node Replication Attacks in
Sensor Networks. Both RM and LSM fall into the category
of witness node-based techniques. Parno et al. [28] have
introduced twomore distributed algorithms for the detection
of clone nodes in wireless sensor networks which are quite
mature schemes as compared to DM. The first protocol is
called randomizedmulticast (RM) which distributes location
claims to a randomly selected set of witness nodes. The
birthday paradox [39] predicts that a collision will occur with
high probability if the adversary attempts to replicate a node.
Their second protocol, line-selectedmulticast (LSM), exploits
the routing topology of the network to select witnesses for
a node location and utilizes geometric probability to detect
replicated nodes.
In RM, each node broadcasts a location claim to its
one-hop neighbors. Then, each neighbor selects randomly
witness nodes within its communication range and forwards
the location claim with a probability to the nodes closest to
chosen locations by using geographic routing. At least one
witness node is likely to receive conflicting location claims
according to birthday paradox when replicated nodes exist in
the network. In LSM, themain objective is to reduce the com-
munication costs and increase the probability of detection.
Besides storing location claims in randomly selected witness
nodes, the intermediate nodes for forwarding location claims
can also be witness nodes. This seems like randomly drawing
a line across the network, and the intersection of two lines
becomes the evidence node of receiving conflicting location
claims.
2.2.3. A New Protocol for Securing Wireless Sensor Networks
against Node ReplicationAttacks. This technique falls into the
category of generation- or group-based techniques. Bekara
and Laurent-Maknavicius [40, 41] have proposed a new
protocol for securing WSN against node replication attack
by limiting the order of deployment using symmetric poly-
nomial for pair-wise key establishment and defined group-
based deploymentmodel.Their scheme requires sensors to be
deployed progressively in successive generations (or group).
Each node belongs to a unique generation. In their scheme,
only newly deployed nodes are able to establish pairwise keys
with their neighbors, and all nodes in the network know the
number of the highest deployed generation. Therefore, the
clone nodes will fail to establish pair-wise keys with their
neighbors since the clone nodes belong to an old deployed
generation.
2.2.4. A Randomized, Efficient, and Distributed Protocol for
the Detection of Node Replication Attacks in Wireless Sensor
Networks. This technique falls into the category of witness
node-based techniques. Conti et al. have proposed a random-
ized, efficient, and distributed protocol called RED [42, 43]
for the detection of node replication attack. It is executed at
fixed intervals of time and consists in two steps. In first step, a
random value, 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑, is shared between all the nodes through
base station. The second step is called detection phase. In
the detection phase, each node broadcasts its claim (ID and
location) to its neighboring nodes. Each neighbor node that
hears a claim sends (with probability 𝑝) this claim to a set
of 𝑔 pseudorandomly selected network locations.The pseudo
random function takes as an input ID, random number, and
𝑔. Every node in the path (from claiming node to the witness
destination) forwards the message to its neighbor nearest to
the destination. Hence, the replicated nodes will be detected
in each detection phase. When next time the RED executes,
the witness nodes will be different since the random value
which is broadcasted by the BS is changed.
2.2.5. Efficient Distributed Detection of Node Replication
Attacks in Sensor Networks. These techniques falls into the
category of witness node-based techniques. Zhu et al. [44, 45]
have proposed two distributed protocols for detecting node
replication attacks called single deterministic cell (SDC) and
parallel multiple probabilistic cells (P-MPC). In both proto-
cols, the whole sensor network is divided into cells to form a
geographic grid. In SDC, each node ID is uniquely mapped
to one of the cells in the grid. When executing detection
procedure, each node broadcasts a location claim to its
neighbors. Then, each neighbor forwards the location claim
with a probability to a unique cell by executing a geographic
hash function [46] with the input of node ID. Once any
node in the destination cell receives the location claim, it
floods the location claim to the entire cell. Each node in the
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destination cell stores the location claim with a probability.
Therefore, the clone nodes will be detected with a certain
probability since the location claims of clone nodes will be
forwarded to the same cell. Like SDC, in the P-MPC scheme,
a geographic hash function [46] is employed to map node
identity to the destination cells. However, instead of mapping
to single deterministic cell, in P-MPC the location claim is
mapped and forwarded to multiple deterministic cells with
various probabilities. The rest of the procedure is similar to
SDC.
2.2.6. (Space-Time)-Related Pairwise Key Predistribution
Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks. This technique falls
into the category of base station-based techniques. Fei et al.
[47] have proposed a polynomial based space-time-related
pairwise key predistribution scheme (PSPP-PKPS, for short
PSPP) for wireless sensor networks, which relates the keying
material of a node with its deployment time and location.
In PSPP, the keying material of a node can only work at its
initial deployment location. If a node leaves its deployment
location, its keying material will become invalid. By using
this idea, their scheme provides resistance against the clone
attack.
2.2.7. A Neighbor-Based Detection Scheme for Wireless Sensor
Networks against Node Replication Attacks. This technique
falls into the category of neighborhood-based techniques. Ko
et al. [48] have proposed a real time neighbor-based detection
scheme (NBDS) for node replication attack in wireless sensor
networks.Themain idea of their scheme is thatwhen a person
moves to another community, he will meet new neighbors
and tell his new neighbors where he comes from through
chatting. But new neighbors will not check if he lies or not.
However, if some of his new neighbors ask his previous
neighbors whether this newcomer really comes from the
community that he claims, the identity of the newcomer
can be implicitly verified. If previous neighbors say that this
person still lives in the original neighborhood, the newcomer
can be detected as a replica. This observation motivates their
research on node replication attacks, and replicas are detected
in the same way.
2.2.8. Distributed Detection of Node Capture Attacks in Wire-
less Sensor Networks. This technique falls into the category
of base station-based techniques. Ho [49] has proposed a
node capture detection scheme for wireless sensor networks.
Their scheme detects the captured sensor nodes by using
the sequential analysis. They use the fact that the physically
captured nodes are not present in the network during the
period from the captured time to the redeployment time.
Accordingly, captured nodes would not participate in any
network operations during that period. By leveraging this
intuition, the captured nodes can be detected by using the
sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) [50]. The protocol
first measures the absence time period of a sensor node and
then compares it to a predefined threshold. If it is more than
threshold value, the sensor node is considered as a captured
node.The efficient node capture detection capability depends
on a properly configured threshold value.
2.2.9. Memory Efficient Protocols for Detecting Node Replica-
tion Attacks in Wireless Sensor Networks. These techniques
fall into the category of witness node-based techniques.
Zhang et al. [3] have proposed four memory efficient mul-
ticast protocols for replication detection, namely, memory
efficient multicast with Bloom filters (B-MEM), memory
efficient multicast with Bloom filters and Cell Forwarding
(BC-MEM), memory efficient multicast with cross forward-
ing (C-MEM), and memory efficient multicast with cross
and cell forwarding (CC-MEM). The first protocol B-MEM
use Bloom filters to compress the information stored at the
sensors and the location claim C𝛼 of a node 𝛼 is multicast
via its neighbors to a number of randomly selected locations
in the network. Each neighbor 𝛽 has a probability 𝑝 to
participate in the multicast. If it does, it becomes a witness
node and sends C𝛼 to a random location in the network.The
node closest to that location will be another witness node w
to store C𝛼. The watcher nodes on the routing path 𝑃 from 𝛽
to w only store the membership of ID𝛼 and l𝛼 in the Bloom
filters. Such membership information can help them detect
any conflicting location claim C’𝛼 received later, and guide
C’𝛼 along 𝑃 to either 𝛽 or 𝑤, which will then broadcast both
C𝛼 and C’𝛼 to the entire network in order to revoke node 𝛼
and its replicas.
The second protocol BC-MEM is designed on top of B-
MEM. It adopts a cell forwarding technique that not only
solves the crossover problem but also reduces the memory
overhead. The deployment area is divided into virtual cells.
In each cell an anchor point is assigned for every node in the
network. The anchor point for a node 𝛼 is determined by 𝛼
ID. The node closest to the anchor point is called the anchor
node for 𝛼. In B-MEM, when a location claim is forwarded
on a line segment, all intermediate nodes on the line serve
as watchers, while the first node and the last node serve as
witnesses. In contrast, in BC-MEM a claim is not forwarded
on the line segment. It is forwarded to the anchor point in
the next cell where the line segment intersects. The claim is
forwarded from one anchor node to another until reaching
the last cell. The anchor nodes in the intermediate cells are
watchers, and the anchor nodes in the first and last cells are
witnesses.
The third protocol C-MEM is designed on top of B-MEM.
It incorporates a new cross forwarding technique to solve
the crowded center problem. B-MEM stores the information
about a location claim along randomly selected line segments,
which are likely to pass the center area of the deployment. On
the other hand, C-MEM first selects a random point (called
the cross point) in the network and forwards the location
claim to that point. From there, it forwards the claim along the
horizontal and vertical lines that pass the cross point. While
the node closest to the cross point is a witness node, the nodes
along the horizontal and vertical lines are watchers. Since the
cross points for all location claims are distributed uniformly
at random in the network, it is no longer true that the lines
pass the center area more frequently. C-MEM does not use
cell forwarding.
The fourth protocol CC-MEM combines cross forward-
ing and cell forwarding to solve both the crowded center
problem and the crossover problem, such that it can detect
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node replication attack with high probability and low over-
head.
2.2.10. Active Detection of Node Replication Attacks. This
technique falls into the category of base station-based tech-
niques. Melchor et al. [51] have proposed a distributed proto-
col for the detection of replication attack for wireless sensor
networks, in which each node verifies at random a few other
nodes in the network.The proposed protocol does not build a
distributed database of location claims that will contain local
conflicting claims when replicas exist. The idea is that each
node will actively test if 1 k other randomnodes are replicated
or not; they call them the scrutinized nodes. In order to test
whether a scrutinized node 𝛼 is replicated or not, 2 k nodes
are randomly chosen in the network and asked to forward to
𝛼 a request for a signed location claim. If two replicas exist,
each will probably receive a request, and if both answer, two
conflicting claims will be obtained by the queerer.
2.2.11. Randomly Directed Exploration: An Efficient Node
Clone Detection Protocol in Wireless Sensor Networks (RDE).
This technique falls into the category of witness node-based
techniques. Zhijun et al. [52] have presented a novel clone
node detection protocol called randomly directed explo-
ration.This protocol does not call for any unrealistic assump-
tions. Each node only needs to know its neighbor nodes.
During the detection procedure, nodes issue claiming mes-
sages containing neighbor list with a maximum hop limit to
randomly selected neighbors. The previous transmission of a
claiming message forms a direction, and then the intermedi-
ate node tries to follow the direction to forward the message.
During forwardingmessages, the intermediate nodes explore
the claiming messages for node clone detection. In such a
simple way, the proposed protocol can efficiently detect clone
nodes in the dense sensor networks. In addition, the protocol
consumes almost minimum memory during detection, and
communication payload is satisfactory. It can scale to large
configurations. They have implemented the protocol in the
OMNet++ simulation framework.
2.2.12. Random-Walk-Based Approach to Detect Clone Attacks
in Wireless Sensor Networks. These two techniques fall into
the category of witness node-based techniques. Zeng et al. [4]
have proposed two protocols RAndom WaLk (RAWL) and
Table-assisted RAndom WaLk (TRAWL) for the detection
of clone attack in wireless sensor networks. The RAndom
WaLk (RAWL) starts several random walks randomly in the
network for each node a, and then selects the passed nodes
as the witness nodes of node a. RAWL works in four steps
in each execution. In the first step, each node broadcasts
a signed location claim. In the second step, each of the
node neighbors probabilistically forwards the claim to some
randomly selected nodes. In the thirds step, each randomly
selected node sends a message containing the claim to start
a random walk in the network, and the passed nodes are
selected as witness nodes and will store the claim. In the
fourth step, if any witness receives different location claims
for same node ID, it can use these claims to revoke the
replicated node.
The second protocol, Table-assisted RAndom WaLk
(TRAWL), is based on RAWL and adds a trace table at each
node to reduce memory cost. Usually, the memory cost is
due to the storage of location claims, but in TRAWL each
node only stores 𝑂(1) location claims (although the size of
the trace table is still 𝑂(√𝑛 log 𝑛), the size of a table entry
is much smaller than the size of a location claim). When a
randomly chosen node starts a random walk, all the passed
nodes will still become witness nodes. However, now they
do not definitely store the location claim, instead, they store
the location claim independently with probability 𝑐
2
√𝑛 log 𝑛,
where 𝑐
2
is a constant. Also, each witness node will create a
new entry in its trace table for recording the pass of a location
claim.
2.2.13. CINORA: Cell-Based Identification of Node Replication
Attack in Wireless Sensor Networks. GautamThakur [24] has
proposed two distributed methods for detecting node repli-
cation attack based on intersecting sets called CINORA-Inset
and restricted cell two-phase authentication model called
CINORA-Hybrid. Initially, the sensor network is divided into
geographical cells similar to the existing cellular network.
However, their approach does not deterministically map a
nodes identity to a cell. In CINORA-Inset, location claims
from the nodes are distributed among a subset of cells
to detect any replication. These cells are generated from a
nonnull intersecting subset algorithm.The inherent property
of this algorithm is for any two subsets𝐶
𝑖
and𝐶
𝑗
of total 1 ≤ 𝑖,
𝑗 ≤ 𝑁 cells, and 𝐶
𝑖
∩ 𝐶
𝑗
̸= 0. Thus, during the authentication
phase at least one cell receives conflicting location claims
if adversary has ever attempted to replicate a legitimate
node. In CINORA-Hybrid a base station-based two-phase
authentication scheme is used in which a sensor node has a
valid residence entry permit for a cell. If permitted and nodes
current residing cell is different or two (or more) similar
permits are detected with different location claims, then that
identity node is removed from the network.
2.2.14. A Note-Based Randomized and Distributed Protocol
for Detecting Node Replication Attacks in Wireless Sensor Net-
works. This technique falls into the category of witness node-
based techniques. Meng et al. [53] have proposed a note-
based randomized and distributed protocol called NRDP,
for detecting node replication attacks, which introduces no
significant overhead on the resource-constrained sensors.
This protocol does not need the geographic locations of nodes
as well. Three types of nodes are assumed in the network,
namely, a claimer node, a reporter node, and a witness node.
A node which broadcasts a claim message is a claimer node.
Neighbor node which forwards a claim message is a reporter
node. And the destination node of a claimmessage is awitness
node. This protocol works in two phases: neighbor discovery
period and replication detection period. In the beginning
of NRDP, it is a neighbor discovery period in which each
node in the network broadcasts a message within its one-hop
neighbors. After neighbor discovery period, each node in the
network gets a neighbor list.The replication detection period
starts when the neighbor discovery period ends. Replication
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detect period consist of two steps. The first step is called
request-note step and the second step is called send claim
step. In request-note step, node 𝛼 randomly chooses a node
𝛾 from its neighbor list as its reporter node, and then sends
a request-note message to the reporter node. Upon receiving
𝛼 request-note message, node 𝛾 replies with a signature note
message which contains a note. The parameter time is fresh
time of the note. Nodes in the network use it to identify the
validity of a note received in different iterations. Note is an
evidence to prove that the reporter node of a claimer node is
existing and valid. In the send-claim step, every node gener-
ates a claim message, which includes a signed subneighbor
list and a note got from the corresponding reporter node.
The parameter list in the claim message is an ID list, which
consists of q 𝛼’s neighbor node IDs. And the reporter node 𝛾
must be in the list. Each node 𝛼 then broadcasts the claim
message in one-hop neighbors. When the reporter node
receives corresponding claim message, it first verifies the
signature and the time fresh of the note contained in the claim
message. Further, the reporter node verifies that the list in the
claim message contains its ID. If all the verifications succeed,
using a pseudorandom function, the reporter node calculates
𝑔 witness nodes for the claimer node. This function takes in
input, the ID of the claimer node, which is the first argument
of the claimmessage, the current rand value, and the number
𝑔 of witness nodes that has to be generated.Thewitness nodes
of a certain node change in different iterations. A trusted
entity broadcasts a seed rand to the network before each
detection iteration starts. This prevents the adversary from
anticipating the witness nodes in a given protocol iteration.
The reporter node analyzes the claimmessage, then generates
a forwarded claim message, and forwards the forwarded
claimmessage to all the𝑔witness nodes.The forwarded claim
message just contains the subneighbor list signed by claimer
node, without note. When a node receives a claim message,
it first checks whether it is the corresponding reporter node.
If it is the reporter node of the claimer node, it checks the
signature, the fresh of the note, and the list in the claim
message. If it is not the reporter node, with probability pc
it does the checking jobs as the reporter node does. It is
necessary for nonreporter node neighbors to do the checking
jobswith probability pc.This can prevent a claimer node from
specifying a nonexisting neighbor node as its reporter node.
Each node in the network has to specify an actual neighbor
node as its reporter node, or it will be detected as a replicated
node by its neighbor nodes.
Each witness node that receives a forwarded claim mes-
sage verifies the signature and time fresh firstly. Then, it
compares the claim to each previously stored claim. If it is the
first time received claim contains ID𝛼, then it simply stores
the claim. If a claim from ID𝛼 has been received, the witness
checks whether the claimed neighbor list is the same as the
stored claim. If a conflict is found, the witness detects a node
replication attack. Then, the witness triggers a revocation
procedure for ID𝛼. Actually, because there is always only
one reporter node for a claimer node, if the claimer node is
a valid node, its corresponding witness nodes would never
receive more than one forwarded claim message from the
claimer node. Therefore, once a witness node receives two
claims containing the same ID in one detection iteration, it
detects a replication attack.The two signature claims become
evidence to trigger the revocation of the replicated node.The
witness node forwards both claims to the base station. The
base station will broadcast a signature message within the
network to revoke the replicated node.
2.2.15. Distributed Detection of Replication with Deployment
Knowledge in Wireless Sensor Networks. This technique falls
into the category of group-based techniques. Ho et al. [54]
have proposed three group deployment knowledge-based
schemes for the detection of node replication attack in
wireless sensor networks. Their schemes are based on the
assumption that nodes are deployed in groups. By taking
advantage of group deployment knowledge, the proposed
schemes perform replica detection in a distributed, efficient,
and secure manner. The sensors can be preloaded with rele-
vant knowledge about their own group’s membership and all
group locations. Then, the sensors in the same group should
be deployed at the same time in the location given to that
group. The three proposed schemes are basic, location claim,
and multigroup approaches. The first scheme is the basic
scheme in which each node only accepts the messages from
the member’s of their own group (trusted nodes) not from
other groups (untrusted nodes). It stops intercommunication
between groups. An advantage of this basic scheme is low
communication and computational or memory overhead.
But the problem that is even honest nodes suffer from
communication due to the fact that the deployment points
are far away from their group. The network becomes poorly
connected and not suitable for high resilient applications.
To solve this problem, second scheme is proposed which
also forwards messages from untrusted nodes as long as they
provide provable evidence that they are not replicas but based
on only predetermined locations for replica detection. The
second scheme achieves high replication detection capability
with less communication, computational, and storage over-
heads as compared to the first scheme, but there is a risk of
DoS by flooding fake claims.
The third scheme protects against this kind of aggressive
adversary. Every sensor node sends its neighbor’s location
claims to multiple groups rather than a single group. This
scheme has higher communication overhead. It can provide a
trade-off between the overhead and resilience to attack. This
scheme provides very strong resilience to node compromise,
since attacker needs to compromise multiple groups of nodes
to prevent replicas being undetected.
2.2.16. Distributed Detection of Node Replication Attack
Resilient to Many Compromised Nodes in Wireless Sensor Net-
works. This technique falls into the category of group-based
techniques. Sei andHoniden [55] have proposed a distributed
protocol for the detection of node replication attack that is
resilient tomany compromised nodes.Theirmethod does not
need any reliable/trusted entities. To prevent an attacker from
learning the location of a witness node of a compromised
node, the protocol uses a one-time seed for each replicated
node detection process; that is, each node has the role of
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starting a detection process, and it is preloaded with the
assigned turn number and seed for the turn.
When node has a turn starting detection process, it sends
the seed and its ID with a signature. Other nodes verify the
signature and execute the detection process if the verification
succeeds.They divide nodes into groups to increase resiliency
to fault nodes and compromised nodes. The role of the
starting detection process is not assigned to each node but to
each group. If at least one node of a group survives, the group
can start the detection process during its turn. An attacker
must compromise the first node of a group which has the
next turn starting detection process if he wants to learn the
location of the witness node in the next detection process.
2.2.17. A Resilient and Efficient Replication Attack Detection
Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks. This technique falls
into the category witness node-based techniques. Kim et al.
[56] have presented a distributed, deterministic approach to
detect node replication attack. Their scheme works in three
steps: initialization, witness node discovery phase, and node
revocation phase. In initialization phase, before deployment,
a base station (BS) associates a particular location coordinate
(hereafter referred to as the verification point, vp) with each
node id using geographic hash function 𝐹. A vp is the target
location coordinate in the network where each sensor node
will be verified, and it can be predetermined by a network
operator to a certain extent with experience. In witness
node discovery phase, the replicas with the same id but
different deployment locations are detected through location
claim message. In the last phase of node revocation base
station BS floods the revocation node lists after checking out
the revocation request message received from the witness
nodes. Once a BS receives this revocation request message,
it checks whether the revocation request message is correctly
encrypted by witness node using a pair-wise key shared with
witness node. If the key is correct, a BS floods a list of replica
nodes including reporter node through the network. If the
key fails, which means that an attacker sent the forged replica
revocation message, the BS regards that reporter node has
been compromised.
3. Comparison of Node Replica Detection
Schemes for Static WSNs
In this paper, we have addressed an important attack on
WSN referred to as node replication attack or clone node
attack. So far, many techniques have been proposed to detect
node replication attack in static WSNs which are broadly
categorized into centralized and distributed techniques. We
have compared all the techniques according to their year of
publication, identifying their shortcomings.
3.1. Centralized Techniques. Centralized techniques are con-
sidered to be the first solutions for detecting replicated nodes
which are simple but suffer from several common drawbacks.
Some of the limitations of centralized techniques are found to
be fairly serious like the base stationwhich introduces a single
point of failure, and any compromise of the base station will
render the solution useless; also, even if there are no attacks
the nodes surrounding the base station will suffer an undue
communication burden which may shorten the lifetime of
a network, and this approach also incurs an observable
processing delay. Consequently, centralized detections have
barely an advantage over distributed detections making a
distributed solution a necessity. The asymptotic performance
of centralized techniques (including their memory and
communication cost) is shown in Table 1. Localized voting
protocols are also considered as the first naı¨ve solutions for
the detection of clone nodes which are unable to deal with
distributed node replication attacks, in which replicas are
placed at least two hops away from each other. In order to
detect replicas which are spreading anywhere in the network
a fully distributed solution is needed that also incurs small
memory and energy overhead.
In 2004, one of the first solutions for detecting replicated
nodes was proposed by Dutertre et al., outlined in [57] which
was based on a centralized base station for node replica
detection.This scheme was themost straightforward one and
a naive solution that provided a low defense against node
replication attacks, suffering from several drawbacks as men-
tioned before.
In 2007, Brooks et al. [32] proposed a clone detection
protocol which was based on random pairwise key pre-
distribution schemes and used to tackle with detection of
cloned cryptographic keys rather than clones sensor nodes.
This solution seemed effective but only when the size of the
keys predistributed to each node is small and more clones
exist in the network, thus implying poor detection accuracy.
Moreover, it is assumed in the protocol that the connections
between all nodes are possibly equal, while practically in
WSNs, any sensor node can only communicate with a limited
number of neighbors within a finite wireless communication
radius. Another drawback of this solution is that it has
neglected to ensure that the participating clones report their
keys honestly to the base station.
Choi et al. [23] proposed another centralized detection
technique named SET in 2007 which was an attempt to
reduce the detection overhead by computing set operations.
But the message authentication codes used for additional
security resulted in even higher detection cost in terms of
computation and communication. Moreover, SET protocol
is highly complex due to its complicated components, and
unexpectedly an adversary can misuse the detection protocol
to revoke honest nodes.
Another centralized approach was proposed in 2008
by Xing et al. [34] which used social fingerprint for the
detection of clones, but it was purely based on fixed WSNs,
and thus neither node addition nor disappearance can be
handled. Furthermore, besides all the common limitations of
centralized solutions, it cannot handle a sophisticated replica
which can cleverly compute by itself a fingerprint consistent
with its neighborhood in order to flee the detection at the
sensor side. A more intelligent replica can dodge and avoid
the detection at the base station simply by not communicating
with the base station.
The most recent solution for the detection of node
replication attack or clones is a centralized technique given
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Table 1: Asymptotic performance of centralized schemes.
Type of scheme Technique/scheme Communication cost Memory cost
Key usage based Brooks et al. scheme [32] 𝑂(𝑛 log 𝑛) —
Base station based SET [23] 𝑂(𝑛) 𝑂(𝑑)
CSI [38] 𝑂(𝑛 log 𝑛) —
Neighborhood social signature based Xing et al. scheme [34] C ⋅ (1 + ratio) 𝑂(𝑑) + min(𝑀, 𝜔 ⋅ log
2
𝑀)
Cluster head-based techniques Znaidi et al. scheme [36] 𝑂(𝑡2) 𝑂(𝑡)
𝑛: no. of nodes in the network, 𝜔: the column weight in the superimposed 𝑠-disjunct code, C: message generated by sensor node, d: degree of neighboring
nodes,M: the number of rows in the superimposed s-disjunct code, ratio = log
2
𝑀/𝐿packet × 100%, and 𝐿packet : the bit-length of a regular message.
by Yu et al. [38] in 2012. They have used a novel concept of
compressed sensing for the identification of clones in the sen-
sor network. This technique has the lowest communication
overhead, but it suffers from all the common drawbacks of
centralized techniques as BS is responsible for the aggregation
of the result (decision) about the identification of clones in the
network.
Considering the limitations of centralized detection
schemes, the researchers move to a distributed solution for
detecting clones, and the first naı¨ve solution that was pro-
posed was called node-to-network broadcasting (N2NB).
Although the scheme was simple it also suffered from high
memory and communication cost for large sensor networks.
3.2. Distributed Techniques. We have investigated a dozen
distributed detection protocols by asymptotically comparing
their communication and memory costs, and they are shown
in Table 2. As all the proposed solutions use different moti-
vations and assumptions and thus have their respective
strengths and weaknesses, we cannot make any general or
definite remarks that which solution is the best one.
Distributed techniques for the detection of clone node
attack are categorized into threemain classes, namely, witness
node-based, neighbor-based, and generation-based or group-
based techniques. All the three categories have their own
pros and cons. For neighbor-based technique [48], the neigh-
boring nodes should be static and any addition or removal
of nodes is not possible throughout the detection process
because in doing so the detection process is affected severely.
For the generation- or group-based techniques [40, 41, 54, 55]
all the nodes are deployed in groups, and no new node can
be added in a particular group. Also, nodes should have
location or network information before node deployment.
These techniques only prevent the node replication attack but
are unable to detect the clone nodes.
The witness node-based techniques use a framework
called claimer-reporter-witness framework in which a node
referred to as claimer locally broadcasts it, location claim
to its neighbors. Each neighbor serves as a reporter and
employs a function to map the claimer ID, to a witness. The
neighbor forwards the claim to the witness and if it receives
two different location claims for the same nodded id then it
means that the adversary has replicated a node.The adversary
can also employ a function to know about the witness for the
given claimer ID and may also locate and compromise the
witness node before she inserts the replicas into the wireless
sensor networks in order to evade the detection.
A relatively more mature distributed detection scheme
was proposed in 2007 by Parno et al. [28] known as deter-
ministic multicast (DM) which was the first to use a frame-
work called claimer-reporter-witness framework. Although
its design goal was to reduce communication cost, it was
treated as an unfavorable protocol because of its several
drawbacks. Firstly, it does not provide much security as an
adversary only needs to compromise all the 𝑔 witnesses for
a given claimer id deploying as many replicas as she desires
without activating an alarm. Secondly, it does not work for
large 𝑔 as both the network communication and the node
storage are proportional to 𝑔, and with very small 𝑔, an
adversary can produce unlimited replicas. Considering DM
as unappealing due to its deterministic property, Parno et al.
[28] have proposed and developed two more techniques as
improvements of DM protocol, namely, randomized multi-
cast (RM) and line selected multicast (LSM). The security
was improved but at the price of increased communication/
memory costs. In both of these protocols the problem lies
in the selection of witness nodes (i.e., Probabilities) and also
it is not always true that location claims of clone nodes are
received to the same witness node. Moreover, both RM
and LSM are unable to detect masked replication attack. To
decrease the communication cost of RM protocol, LSM was
developed as a less expensive version of RM, but it suffers
from uneven distribution of witnesses nodes. As majority of
witness nodes are selected from the center of the network,
thus the energy of these nodes is depleted soon, and also they
become the point of interest for the adversary.
Zhu et al. [44, 45] proposed two techniques called single
deterministic cell (SDC) and parallel multiple probabilistic
cells (P-MPC) in 2007 as the variations of DM. Practically,
both of these techniques depend upon the careful selection
of a cell size (s) because if the cell size is too large, they
incur high communication cost like N2NB, and if s is too
small, it will be very easy for an adversary to trounce them by
compromising all nodes in the 𝑔 deterministic tiny cells. An
important problem with SDC is that in order to reduce the
broadcast overhead, it requires to execute the flooding only
when the first copy of a node location claim arrives at the cell,
and the following copies are ignored. In doing this, the node
in the cell that first receives the location claim is unable to
distinguish between claims of original node and replica node.
Another attempt to detect clones was made by Conti
et al. [42, 43] in 2007 who have proposed a randomized,
efficient, and distributed protocol named RED by combining
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Table 2: Asymptotic performance of distributed schemes.
Type of scheme Technique/scheme Communication cost Memory cost
Node-to-network broadcasting N2NB [28] 𝑂(𝑛2) 𝑂(1)
Witness node
DM [28] 𝑂(𝑔 log√𝑛/𝑑) 𝑂(𝑔)
RM [28] 𝑂(𝑛2) 𝑂(√𝑛)
LSM [28] 𝑂(𝑛√𝑛) 𝑂(√𝑛)
RED [42, 43] 𝑂(𝑔 ⋅ 𝑝 ⋅ 𝑑𝑛√𝑛) 𝑂(𝑔 ⋅ 𝑝 ⋅ 𝑑)
SDC [44, 45] 𝑂(𝑟 ⋅ √𝑛) + 𝑂(𝑠) 𝑂(𝜔)
P-MPC [44, 45] 𝑂(𝑟 ⋅ √𝑛) + 𝑂(𝑠) 𝑂(𝜔)
B-MEM [3] 𝑂(𝑘 ⋅ 𝑛 ⋅ √𝑛) 𝑂(𝑡𝑘 + 𝑡󸀠𝑘√𝑛)
BC-MEM [3] — 𝑂(𝑡𝑘 + 𝑡󸀠𝑘√𝑛󸀠)
C-MEM [3] — 𝑂(𝑡 + 𝑡󸀠√𝑛)
CC-MEM [3] — 𝑂(𝑡 + 𝑡󸀠√𝑛󸀠)
Melchor et al. [51] 𝑂(√𝑛) 𝑂(𝑑)
RDE [52] 𝑂(𝑑 ⋅ 𝑛 ⋅ √𝑛) 𝑂(𝑑)
RAWL [4] 𝑂(√𝑛 log 𝑛) 𝑂(√𝑛 log 𝑛)
TRAWL [4] 𝑂(√𝑛 log 𝑛) 𝑂(1)2
Kim et al. [56] 𝑂(√𝑛) 𝑂(√𝑛)
Generation or group based
Bekara and Laurent-Maknavicius [40, 41] 𝑂(√𝑛) 𝑂(1)
Basic scheme [54] 𝑂(𝑚) 𝑂(𝑚)
Location claim base scheme [54] 𝑂(𝑚 + 𝑑) 𝑂(𝑑 + 2𝑚)
Multigroup base scheme [54] 3 ∗ 𝑂(𝑚 + 𝑑) 𝑂(𝑑 + 2 ∗ 𝑚 (1 +𝐷max))
Sei and Honiden [55] 𝑂(𝑟) 𝑂(𝑟 ⋅ √𝑛)
— Ho [49] 𝑂(𝑛√𝑛) 𝑂(𝑛)
Neighborhood based NBDS [48] 𝑂(𝑟 ⋅ √𝑛) 𝑂(𝑟)
𝑛: no. of nodes in the network, 𝑑: degree of neighboring nodes, 𝑔: no. of witness nodes, 𝑟: communication radius, s: the number of sensors in a cell,𝑝: probability
that neighboring node will forward the location claim, 𝜔: the column weight in the superimposed 𝑠-disjunct code, and 𝜉: distinct IDs from set of nodes as
monitor.
the benefits of both DM and RM.This protocol is considered
to be the most promising detection protocol which has
solved the crowded center problem as the selection of witness
nodes is random and fully distributed. Also, RED [4] is
such an “area oblivious” protocol that associates sensor nodes
with almost even responsibility, and the selection of witness
nodes is pseudorandom which leads to a uniform witness
distribution. Besides these advantages, the only drawback of
RED is the deterministic selection of witness nodes and that
the infrastructure for distributing RED’s random seed may
not always be available. RED is also unable to detect masked
replication attack.
Bekara et al. [40, 41] in 2007 proposed a solution for
preventingWSN from node replication attack which exploits
the fact that excluding new nodes from joining the network
can prevent replication attacks. The main drawback of this
scheme is that the sensor nodes are bound to their groups
and geographic locations.
In 2009, Zhang et al. [3] have proposed four memory
efficient multicast protocols for the detection of replicated
nodes, namely, Bloom filter MEM, Bloom filters and cell
forwarding MEM, cross forwarding MEM, and last is cross
forwarding and cell forwarding MEM. B-MEM is an exten-
sion of LSM, but it incurs additional memory consumption
per node, and it may also lower the detection rate of LSM
due to false verifications (false positives of Bloom filters).
BC-MEM requires highly accurate localization due to its
cell division and anchor node selection which may not be
affordable for current generation ofWSNs. Also, an adversary
can elude BC-MEM by compromising certain deterministic
anchor nodes. In case of both C-MEM and CC-MEM, cross
forwarding achieves high detection probability for convex
deployment field (particularly for rectangle-shaped deploy-
ment field), but for other irregular topologies considered by
LSM (like thin cross and large H), these two schemes may
work poorly by dropping the detection rate significantly.
A simplified version of N2NB was proposed by Zhang
et al. [3] in 2009 known as randomly directed exploration
(RDE). Its network communication overhead is reduced, but
storage cost remains the same with N2NB.The detection rate
is also decreased and may not be very significant even for a
convex deployment field concluding that RDE appears to be
feasible only for an ideal network model.
Another work in this area is done by Zeng et al. [4] in
2010 who have proposed two detection protocols, namely,
RAndom WaLk (RAWL) and Table-assisted RAndom WaLk
(TRAWL) for the detection of node replication attack. Both
of these protocols are an extension of LSM and thus suffer
from the same drawbacks. Although they have much higher
detection probability than LSM, both RAWL and TRAWL
require more than twice the communication overhead of
LSM.
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For an inclusive survey, we have also analyzed some other
distributed techniques which are neither very popular nor
have promising results in detecting node replication attack.
These techniques includeHo et al. [54] proposed in 2009,Kim
et al. [56] proposed in 2009, andMeng et al. [53] proposed in
2010.
4. Detection Techniques for Mobile WSNs
Mobility has become an important area of research for WSN
community. In mobile WSNs, mobility plays a key role in the
execution of the application as the introduction of mobile
entities can resolve someproblems andoffermany advantages
over the static WSNs. The node replica detection techniques
developed for static WSNs, do not work when the nodes are
expected to move as in mobile WSNs, and thus they have
turned out to be ineffective for mobile WSNs. As a result
some techniques (still not mature enough) have also been
developed for mobile WSNs to detect the replica or clone
nodes. These techniques are classified into two main classes
as centralized and distributed and are described below.
4.1. Centralized Techniques
4.1.1. Fast Detection of Replica Node Attack in Mobile Sensor
Networks Using Sequential Analysis. Ho et al. [58, 59] have
proposed a mobile replica detection scheme based on the
sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) [50].Their protocol is
based on the fact that an uncompromisedmobile node should
never move at speeds in excess of the system-configured
maximum speed. As a result, an uncompromised (original)
mobile sensor node measured speed will appear to be at
most the system-configuredmaximum speed as long as speed
measurement system with low error rate is employed. On
the other hand, replica nodes will appear to move much
faster than original nodes, and thus their measured speeds
will likely be over the system-configured maximum speed
because they need to be at two (or more) different places
at once. Accordingly, if it is observed that a mobile node
measured speed is over the system-configured maximum
speed, it is then highly likely that at least two nodes with the
same identity are present in the network. By leveraging this
intuition, the SPRT is performed on every mobile node using
a null hypothesis that themobile node has not been replicated
and an alternate hypothesis that it has been replicated.
In using the SPRT, the occurrence of a speed that either
lessens or exceeds the system-configured maximum speed
will lead to acceptance of the null and alternate hypotheses,
respectively. Once the alternate hypothesis is accepted, the
replica nodes will be revoked from the network.
4.1.2. A New Protocol for the Detection of Node Replication
Attacks in Mobile Wireless Sensor Networks. Deng and Xiong
[60] have proposed a new protocol to detect the replicas
in mobile WSNs. They have used the idea of polynomial-
based pair-wise key pre-distribution and BloomFilters which
insure that the replicas can never lie about their real iden-
tifiers and collect the number of pair-wise keys established
by each sensor node. Replicas are detected by looking at
whether the number of pair-wise keys established by them
exceeds the threshold. The protocol works in three steps,
node initialization, pair-wise establishment, and detection.
In node initialization, before nodes are deployed, the key
server randomly generates a bivariate symmetric polynomial
over a finite field. After deployment between nodes, pairwise
keys are established. Each node periodically constructs a
report, which includes its ID and counting Bloom filter (or
compressed counting Bloom filter), and sends it to the base
station. At base station, counting bloom filters collect the
number of pairwise keys established by each node. Nodes
whose number of pair-wise keys exceeds the threshold value
are considered to be the clones.
4.2. Distributed Techniques
4.2.1. Mobile Sensor Networks Resilient against Node
Replication Attacks. Chia et al. [61] proposed a novel protocol,
called extremely efficient detection (XED), against node
replication attack inmobile sensor networks.The idea behind
XED is motivated from the observation that for the networks
without replicas, if a sensor node 𝑠
𝑖
meets the other sensor
node 𝑠
𝑗
at earlier time and 𝑠
𝑖
sends a random number 𝑟 to 𝑠
𝑗
at that time, then when 𝑠
𝑖
and 𝑠
𝑗
meet again, 𝑠
𝑖
can ascertain
whether this is the node 𝑠
𝑗
met before by requesting the
random number 𝑟. Based on this observation, a “remember
and challenge strategy” is proposed. Once two sensor nodes,
𝑠
𝑖
and 𝑠
𝑗
, are within the communication ranges of each other,
they first, respectively, generate random numbers 𝑟𝑠
𝑖
→ 𝑠
𝑗
and 𝑟𝑠
𝑗
→ 𝑠
𝑖
of 𝑏 bits, and then they exchange their generated
random numbers. They also use a table to record the node
ID, the generated random number, and the received random
number in their respective memory. In case the pair of two
nodesmet before, the above procedure is also performed such
that the random number stored in the memory is replaced by
the newly received random number. Consider the example
shown in Figure 4, in which the sensor node 𝑠
𝑖
meets another
sensor node 𝑠
𝑗
. If 𝑠
𝑖
never meets 𝑠
𝑗
before, they exchange
random numbers. Otherwise, the sensor node 𝑠
𝑖
requests the
sensor node 𝑠
𝑗
for the random number 𝑟𝑠
𝑖
→ 𝑠
𝑗
exchanged
at easier time. For the sensor node 𝑠
𝑖
, if the sensor node 𝑠
𝑗
cannot replies or reply a number which does not match the
number in 𝑠
𝑖
memory, 𝑠
𝑖
announces the detection of a replica.
When the replicas meet the genuine nodes, the replicas can
always pretend that they meet for the first time. However, if
the genuine nodes have a record showing that they ever met
at earlier time, the replicas are also detected.
4.2.2. Efficient and Distributed Detection of Node Replication
Attacks in Mobile Sensor Networks. Chia et al. [62] proposed
an efficient and distributed detection (EDD) scheme and its
variant, storage-efficient EDD (SEDD) scheme to detect the
node replication attack. The idea behind EDD and SEDD is
motivated from the following observations. For a network
without replicas, the number of times,𝜇1, inwhich the nodeu
encounters a specific node V, should be limited in a given time
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𝑠𝑗 𝑠𝑗
𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖
2
2
𝑡 = 𝑡1
Generate a random number
𝑟 = 2 and a record (𝑠𝑖, 2)
𝑡 = 𝑡2
Check its own record and
discover that the received
number matches the record
𝑠𝑗 accepts 𝑠𝑖 as
its neighbor
Figure 4: The operations between two genuine nodes in XED at
time 𝑡
1
and 𝑡
2
(gray and black nodes are genuine) [61].
interval of length 𝑇with high probability. For a network with
two replicas V, the number of times,𝜇2, inwhich𝑢 encounters
the replicas with the same ID V, should be larger than a
threshold within the time interval of length 𝑇. According to
these observations, if each node can discriminate between
these two cases, each node has the ability to identify the
replicas. The EDD scheme is composed of two steps: offline
step and online step. The offline step is performed by the
network planner before the sensor deployment. The goal is
to calculate the parameters, including the length 𝑇 of the
time interval and the threshold 𝜓 used for discrimination
between the genuine nodes and the replicas. On the other
hand, the online step will be performed by each node per
move. Each node checks whether the encountered nodes are
replicas by comparing 𝜓 with the number of encounters at
the end of a time interval. It can be observed from EDD
that each node should maintain a list 𝐿, leading to 𝑂(𝑛)
storage overhead. A storage-efficient EDD (SEDD) scheme
is proposed based on the tradeoff between storage overhead
and time interval length. The basic idea behind SEDD is that
instead of monitoring all nodes, each node only monitors a
subset of nodes, calledmonitor set, in a specific time interval.
When the cardinality of the monitor set is selected as 𝜉,
the simplest way for each node to select the nodes to be
monitored at the beginning of a time interval is to randomly
pick 𝜉 distinct IDs from {1, . . . , 𝑛}. Since the storage overhead
is equal to the number of nodes being monitored, the storage
overhead is reduced to the cardinality of the monitor set,
𝑂(𝜉), in the SEDD scheme.
4.2.3. Patrol Detection for Replica Attacks on Wireless Sensor
Networks. Wang and Shi [63] have employed mobile nodes
as patrollers to detect replicas distributed in different zones
in a network, in which a basic patrol detection protocol and
two detection algorithms for stationary and mobile modes
are presented. The detection of replicas in stationary sensors
is based on the assumptions that if two or more sensors in
different locations have the same ID, then all the nodes with
the ID will be regarded as compromised nodes or its replicas.
Also, for mobile sensors (patroller), if a mobile node moves
with a speed higher than the denoted maximum speed, it will
be regarded as a replica attack. In the replica detection of
static sensor nodes, when a mobile patrol node moves to a
new zone, it first discovers its location and then broadcasts
its patrol claim. Each node will be patrolled by at least two
mobile nodes. After receiving the location messages, the
stationary node takes the mobile nodes who patrolled him
as the anchor nodes and will send the patrol node its location
claim. After collecting the answer message, patrol node will
check the location of node, and if the distance is larger than
the signal range, it ignores the wrong message. Otherwise, it
will check the ID of the answer message by using the security
assumption “A legitimate ID only has one location.” Then,
it saves the answer from the original node (benign node)
in a whitelist, saves the replica node ID in a blacklist, and
revokes the replica ID by refusing to distribute secretmaterial
and broadcasting its two answer messages to other mobiles
nodes. Then, patrol node will move to another location to
send his patrol claim in another interval. After a round, it
collects all the saved information of the white- and blacklists
to the user when collecting the sensing data. If the replicas are
deployed in a zone where a patrol node collects their answer
message in a patrol interval, then the patroller can revoke
them immediately after he receives the second answer and
the distance between the two locations exceeds. Else if the
replicas’ answers are collected by different patrol nodes, then
theywill be found by the base station or by exchangemessages
of patrollers after a round. If the adversary compromises
and replicates the patrol node, firstly, an original mobile
patroller will wait for the answer message after he reaches
a new position and sends his claim in time 𝑇, so there is a
static period interval after the patrol broadcasts his claim.
Accordingly, if the patroller node moves and changes its
position in time (𝑇, 𝑇 + interval), then it is highly likely that
at least two nodes with the same identity are present in the
network. Further, the mobile patroller should never move
faster than the system-configured maximum speed 𝑉max.
4.2.4. Single-Hop Detection of Node Clone Attacks in Mobile
Wireless Sensor Networks. Lou et al. [64] have proposed a
node clone attack detection protocol, namely, the single hop
detection (SHP) for mobile wireless sensor networks. The
SHD protocol exploits the fact that at any time, a physical
node (or equivalently, its node ID and private key) cannot
appear at different neighborhood community; otherwise,
there must be replicas in the network. The neighborhood
community of a node is characterized by its one-hop neigh-
bor node list, which is readily available in a typicalWSN since
sensor nodes need to know their neighbors in order to com-
municate with each other. The SHD protocol consists of two
phases, the fingerprint claim and the fingerprint verification
phases. In the fingerprint claimphase each node is required to
sign its neighbor node list. The signed neighbor node list is a
fingerprint of its current neighborhood community, hereafter
referred to as fingerprint claim. The fingerprint claim is
broadcasted in one-hop neighborhood. Upon reception of a
fingerprint claim from a neighboring claim node, the receiver
node will decide whether to become a witness node of the
claim node. When it decides to become a witness node,
the node will then verify the fingerprint claim and finally
store the fingerprint claims of the witnessed nodes locally if
the claim passed the verification process. In the fingerprint
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verification phase, when twonodesmeetwith each other, they
exchange their witnessed node lists, and this can be done by
piggybacking the witnessed node list in the two nodes and
then checking for a possible fingerprint claim conflict with
received claims. In a fingerprint claim conflict, there are two
fingerprint claims with the same ID and private key claiming
two different neighborhood communities, which implies two
detected replicas.
4.2.5. Detecting Node Replication Attacks in Mobile Sensor
Networks: Theory and Approaches. Zhu et al. [65] have
proposed two replica detection algorithms for mobile sensor
networks. First algorithm is a token-based authentication
scheme proposed for the detection of replication attack in
which the replicas do not cooperate (nonconspiring case). For
the case in which the replicas cooperate by communicating
with each other in an efficient manner, a detection method
is proposed which is based on statistics and the random
encounters between physical nodes. In the first algorithm,
the base station periodically broadcasts to the entire sensing
region a timestamp protected by a broadcast authentication
protocol. The broadcast announces the beginning of a detec-
tion round. Upon hearing the timestamp, a genuine mobile
node randomly selects a secret seed 𝑠
𝑖
∈ {0, 1}
𝑙, where 𝑙 is
a common security parameter, and empties its local storage
of the previously received tokens. The detection consists of
a token exchange phase and a mutual authentication phase
When a mobile node first meets with another mobile node
in the detection round, they will exchange a token with each
other and will record the tokens in their memories. When
these mobile nodes meet again in the same detection round,
each will ask the other for the previously exchanged token.
Upon receiving the correct reply, each believes that the other
is authenticated. Otherwise, in case of replica, when genuine
node asks a replica node (to whom it met before) about the
token they have exchanged in their first meeting, the replica
node will reply in no or with a wrong token which will mark
him as replica.
The second algorithm is a statistics-based detection
scheme for detecting replicas that cooperate with each others.
This idea is partially inspired by [66] whose detection
principle is that if a node is not “seen again” by others, it is
likely that the node has been captured. Similarly, herein, the
principle is that if in a certain detection round a node is “seen
again” too many times by others, it is likely that the node is a
replica. Every genuine node contains a step counter “𝑇” and
also its “acquaintance list” consisting of 𝑛 Boolean variables.
Each time a mobile node meets another mobile node, it
increases the counter 𝑇 by 1. If this is its first meeting with
any mobile node, it treats it as an acquaintance and sets the
corresponding bit in the list to 1. Once the acquaintance list
contains all 1’s, the statistics stops. In the nondetection stage
each node reports its numbers of meetings with others when
dropping by the base station.The base station is employed for
centralized analysis. Finally, the node with more encounters
is detected as replica, and base station finally broadcasts the
entire network for replicated IDs.
4.2.6. Emergent Properties: Detection of the Node Capture
Attack in Mobile Wireless Sensor Networks. Conti et al. [66]
have proposed two algorithms for the detection of node
capture attack in mobile wireless sensor networks. Their first
algorithm is simple distributed detection (SDD) in which the
attack is detected using only information local to the nodes.
The second algorithm is called cooperative distributed detec-
tion (CDD) which exploits node collaboration to improve
the detection performance. Both of the proposed algorithms
are based on the simple observations that if node a will not
remeet node b within a certain period of time, then it is
possible that node b has been captured. Hence, node a can
autonomously know the probability that a “not yet remet”
node has been actually captured by the adversary. The SDD
follows the above simple observation that each node 𝑎 is given
the task of tracking a specific set 𝑇
𝑎
of other nodes. For each
node 𝑏 ∈ 𝑇
𝑎
that a gets into the communication range of, a
set the correspondingmeeting time to the value of its internal
clock and start the corresponding timeout, that will expire
after 𝜆 seconds. If the time-out expires (i.e., 𝑎 and 𝑏 did not
remeet), the network is flooded with an alarm triggered by
node 𝑎 to revoke node 𝑏. In CDD, networkmobility and node
cooperation are leveraged to improve node capture detection.
When two nodes 𝑎 and 𝑏 exchange information about the
nodes (if any) that are tracked by both 𝑎 and 𝑏, that is, the
nodes in 𝑇
𝑎
𝑇
𝑏
, the node exchanges information only when
cooperating nodes are in the same communication radius.
This shared information is further used for node capture.
4.2.7. Mobility-Assisted Detection of the Replication in Mobile
Wireless Sensor Networks. Deng et al. [67] have proposed
two schemes for the detection of node replication attack in
mobile wireless sensor networks. The first is called unary
time location storage and exchange (UTLSE), and, second
is called multitime location storage and diffusion (MTLSD).
In both protocols, after receiving the time-location claims,
witnesses carry these claims around the network instead of
transmitting them. That means that data are forwarded only
when appropriate witnesses encounter each other. Only if
two nodes encounter each other, they exchange their time-
location claims, that is, if a tracer receives a time location
claim from its tracked neighbor node, it does not immediately
transmit this time-location claim to the witness if the witness
is not currently within its communication range but stores
that location claim until encountering the witness. UTLSE
detects the replicas by each of the two encountered witnesses
which stores only one time-location claim. On the other
hand, MTLSD stores more time-location claims for each
tracked node and introduces time-location claims diffusion
among witnesses. The detection probability of the MTLSD
protocol is greater than the probability of protocol UTLSE.
5. Comparison of Node Replica Detection
Schemes for Mobile WSNs
Mobile wireless sensor networks (MWSNs) are still in their
infancy, and there are many challenges in MWSNs that are
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still needed to be resolved. These challenges include deploy-
ment, localization, self-organization, navigation and control,
coverage, energy, maintenance, and data process [26]. In case
of localization, node position can be determined once dur-
ing initialization when sensor nodes are deployed statically
[68]. However, when sensor nodes are mobile, they must
continuously obtain their positions as they navigate through
the whole sensing region. As a result, in mobile WSNs,
localization requires additional time and energy and also the
availability of a rapid localization service. Due to the dynamic
network topology of mobile WSNs, they cannot rely on
routing tables or recent route histories as static WSNs do
for passing messages through the network because table data
become outdated quickly; thus, route discovery data must
repeatedly be performed extensively in terms of power, time,
and bandwidth.
Ho et al. [58, 59] have proposed a centralized detection
scheme for mobile WSNs in which accurate measurement is
a prerequisite for acceptable false-negative and -positive rates.
In result, it requires dynamic and precise localization system
and a tight time synchronization which are both nontrivial
tasks. Also, better and accurate sampling entails even much
more expensive equipment (GPS) and thusmay not be afford-
able for the current generation ofWSNs. Another centralized
detection technique is proposed by Deng and Xiong [60]
in which there is no way to ensure, the participating clone
node will report their keys honestly to the base station. It
is possible that an original node number of pairwise keys
exceed the threshold value due to its communication. Also
as the effectiveness of both the above centralized detection
techniques relies on the involvement of the base station,
this easily incurs the problems of single-point failure and
fast energy depletion of the sensor nodes around the base
station.
Yu et al. [61] have proposed distributed detection tech-
nique called extremely efficient detection technique (XED)
in which the authors have assumed that the replicas cannot
communicate and collaborate (or cooperate) with each other
which is theweakness of this schemebecause in casewhen the
replicas cooperate with each other, they can establish secret
channels among each other, and then they can easily deceive
the detection technique. Efficient and distributed detection
(EDD) is another distributed detection technique for mobile
WSNs proposed by Yu et al. [62] which is inapplicable due to
high storage overhead for large-scale WSNs.
Zhu et al. [65] have proposed a token-based detection
technique which fails when a smart attacker establishes secret
channels among replicas as by doing this, replicas can share
the tokens and make the protocol exist in name only.
Conti et al. [66] have proposed two solutions, namely,
SDD and CDD for the detection of node capture. Their
approach is based on a simple observation which completely
assumes that there is no membership change in the network;
for example, at least no nodes die out (meaning run out of
power) which is not the case in reality. Also, it is assumed
implicitly that any senor node is able to flood the entire
mobileWSN with a broadcast message which is also not pos-
sible in reality.
An asymptotic comparison of all the detection schemes
for mobile WSNs is shown in Table 3 where their communi-
cation and memory costs are compared. As all the proposed
solutions use different motivations and assumptions and thus
have their respective strengths and weaknesses, we cannot
make any general or definite remarks that which solution is
the best one.
6. Discussion
Node replication attack or clone attack is one of the most
harmful and dangerous threat to an unattended wireless
sensor network because in this attack an adversary not only
compromises the sensor nodes but can also carry out a large
class of internal attacks for instance DoS attack, Sybil attack,
and Black hole, and wormhole attack, by surreptitiously
inserting arbitrary number of replicas at strategic positions
of the network. Furthermore this is more niggling and trou-
blesome because these replicated nodes, under the control
of an adversary, having all the keying materials, pretend
as authorized users in the network and thus deceiving the
network into accepting them as legitimate nodes. It is difficult
to identify replicas because of two major reasons. First, since
a clone or replica is considered to be completely honest by
its neighbors, the legitimate nodes cannot be aware of the
fact that they have a clone among them. Voting mechanisms
[33, 69] remain unsuccessful to detect clone nodes that are
not within the same neighborhood as a voting mechanism
is used to detect misbehaving nodes and clones within the
neighborhood to agree on the legitimacy of a given node.
Thus, there is a need for global countermeasure that can
detect clones on the global level. Second, the general purpose
security protocols for secure sensor network communication
would allow replica nodes to create pair-wise shared keyswith
other nodes and the base station, and thus in doing so, the
replica nodes are able to encrypt, decrypt, and authenticate all
of their communications as if they were the original captured
nodes.
The process or stages of node replication attack can
be described in the form of a flow chart as shown in
Figure 5. The flow chart concisely describes the instigation
of node replication attack and its detection, from physical
node capture, extraction of secret credentials, cloning and
redeployment and finally the detection and prevention of
node replication attack. At Stage 1, an adversary physically
captures a sensor node. After physical capture the sensor
node remains absent from the network for a specific period
of time. If this absence of a sensor node is detected or a
tamper-proof hardware is used, the attack will be prevented.
Otherwise, an attacker or an adversary starts extracting all
the secret materials of the captured node at Stage 2. At Stage
3, an adversary reprograms the captured node. If an adversary
is unable to use a new hardware, it can compromise the
node and then exploits the compromised node to disrupt the
network operations by its misbehaving activities. At Stage 4,
an adversary makes clones or replicas of the captured nodes
by using new hardware, and these replicas have the same ID
and all other keying materials as that of the captured node.
After making clones or replicas, an adversary redeploys them
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Table 3: Asymptotic performance of schemes against clone node attack in mobile sensor networks.
Nature of scheme Type of scheme Technique/scheme Communication cost Memory cost
Centralized Node speed based Ho et al. scheme [58, 59] 𝑂(𝑛√𝑛) 𝑂(𝑛)
Key usage based Deng and Xiong scheme [60] 𝑂(𝑛 log 𝑛) —
Distributed
Information exchange based XED [61] 𝑂(1) 𝑂(4 ⋅ 𝑑 ⋅ 𝐸[𝑋])
Node meeting based EDD [62] 𝑂(1) 𝑂(𝑛)
SEDD [62] 𝑂(𝑛) 𝑂(𝜉)
Mobility assisted based
Wang and Shi scheme with Base Station [63] 𝑂(𝑛) —
Wang and Shi scheme with out Base Station [63] 𝑂(𝑛 ∗ √𝑘) —
UTLSE [67] 𝑂(𝑛) 𝑂(√𝑛)
MTLSD [67] 𝑂(𝑛) 𝑂(√𝑛)
𝑛: no. of nodes in the network, 𝜉: distinct IDs from set of nodes as monitor, 𝑑: degree of neighboring nodes, and 𝑘: total number of zones.
at strategic positions of the network for further insider attacks
at Stage 5. Finally these replicas or clones can be detected by
using various detection schemes.
Since clone nodes carry all the cryptographic and keying
materials, all the traditional authentication and intrusion
detection techniques are ineffective to discover and detect
these clones or replicas in the network. Keeping this in mind
many techniques have been proposed for the detection of
node replication attack and recall that these are broadly cat-
egorized into centralized and distributed techniques. Some
fairly serious limitations of centralized technique like the base
station introduces a single point of failure, and any compro-
mise of the base station will make the solution useless thus
making distributed solutions a necessity. One important class
of distributed techniques is witness node-based techniques
which are considered to themost favorable techniques yet for
detecting clone nodes. But according to Zeng et al. [4], replica
detection protocols must be non-deterministic and fully
distributed in order to circumvent the existing drawbacks of
witness-based strategies. The witness node-based strategies
ought to fulfill three requirements to have a high probability
of detecting clones or replicas. Firstly, the selection ofwitness-
nodes should be nondeterministic as it is more difficult for
an adversary to launch clone attacks in nondeterministic
protocols successfully because the witnesses of node are not
known and are different in each execution of the protocol.
Secondly, for any given node, all the nodes should have an
equal probability to be the witnesses of that node during the
lifetime of the network. Thirdly, the witness-nodes should be
selected from all over the network randomly and not from
particular area of the network every time meaning that the
witness distribution should be uniform throughout the entire
network.
There are two types of attacks which are the variations of
node replication attack and can be launched by an adversary
against witness node-based schemes. These are named as
smart attack and masked replication attack. Smart attack is
a special witness compromising attack, and in this attack an
adversary avariciously chooses which sensor to corrupt in
order to maximize its chance for its replicas to go undetected.
The adversary finds out the witness nodes which are used to
detect replicas and only compromises these witness nodes
to avoid detection. The witness node-based techniques use
a framework called claimer-reporter-witness framework in
which a node referred to as claimer, locally broadcasts it
location claim to its neighbors. Each neighbor serves as a
reporter and employs a function to map the claimer ID to
a witness. The neighbor forwards the claim to the witness
and if it receives two different location claims for the same
node ID then it means that the adversary has replicated a
node. The adversary can also employ a function to know
about the witness for the given claimer ID, and may also
locate and compromise the witness node before she inserts
the replicas into the wireless sensor network in order to evade
the detection. Inmasked replication attack, the adversarymay
turn to compromise all the neighbors of a replica so as to
prevent a location claim from propagating to any witness
thus eliminating the reporters at all. This attack makes it
possible for such a replica, whose neighbors have all been
compromised, to lie about its physical position. So far, all the
witness node-based techniques have assumed a static WSN,
and are seemed to be the most promising schemes till yet
to detect replicas or clones in static WSN, but alas these
witness node-based schemes and location-based replication
detection schemes are unable to detect and counter these
types of replication attacks.
Nowadays, mobility has become an important area of
research for WSN community. In mobile WSNs, mobility
plays a key role in the execution of the application [68] as
the integration of mobility inWSN can improve the coverage
and utility of the sensor network deployment and enables
more versatile sensing applications as well. However, besides
that the introduction of mobile entities (which freely roam in
the network and are autonomous as being able to reposition
and organize themselves in the network) can resolve some
problems by offering many advantages over the static WSNs
the unique properties of mobile WSNs and the dynamic
mobile network topology pose many new challenges in the
security of mobile WSNs. The idea of detecting clone nodes
in static WSNs is extensively based on the elitism of the node
location meaning that a sensor node should be allied to a
unique deployment position, and if one logical node id is
found to be associated with two or more physical locations,
the node replication is detected. But noticeably this is not
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Stage-1 Physically capture sensor node
Stage-2
Stage-3
Extract information
from captured node
Yes
Yes
Extract all the secret
information (ID, key etc)
Compromise captured
node
Stage-4
Make replicas of the
captured node
Stage-5 Deploy the replicas
The adversary deploy these replica node into different parts of
network to monitor or perform further insider attacks
Stage-6 Detect the replicas Use techniques to counterreplica nodes
The node will be absent for some time
Yes
No
No
No
New hardware
used
Hardware is tamper
resistant
Reprogram the captured
node
Prevent clone attack
from the network
Misbehave and disturb
the network working
Other techniques used
to counter misbehaving
nodes
Load ID and cryptographic info into replica node
Detect the absence
Figure 5: Stages of node replication attack in wireless sensor networks.
applicable to the emerging mobile WSNs where the sensor
nodes are moving freely all the time in the network. Thus,
a little work (which includes significantly different scenarios
and techniques) has been done so far to deal with replicas or
clones in mobile WSNs.
InmobileWSNs, the adversary is alsomobile. In the liter-
ature, the assumed scenario ofmobileWSN is that the sensors
are unable to transmit sensed data at their will because
the sink is not always present. Thus, the data accumulated
in their memories become targets of many adversaries. In
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[30], a mobile adversary model is proposed in which mobile
adversary visits and travels around the network trying to
compromise a subset of sensors within the time interval
when sinks are not present in the network. The time taken
by a mobile adversary to compromise a set of sensors is
much shorter than the time between two successive data
collections of a sink.Thus, it ismuch difficult to snatchmobile
compromised nodes as well as mobile clones.
Another challenge arises in mobile WSNs when a mobile
adversary adopts amore sophisticated strategy named “group
mobility strategy.” In this stratagem, the replicas form a
physically close group which always moves together, but only
a representative of them communicates with the genuine
nodes, whereas the rest of the replicas remain inactive as
“silent learners” so that they can learn (from encounters with
genuine nodes) about any received token or corresponding
meeting instant. Once the replicas have met all the “𝑛” gen-
uine nodes (and thus acquired all the necessary knowledge
to pass later authentications), they can scatter in the sensing
region, and each behaves actively and independently, until the
next detection round starts.
Also, when themobile replicas communicate and collabo-
rate with each other and share their keys or randomnumbers,
they can make the detection technique fails to thwart them
easily. Thus, mobile WSNs offer much more challenges in
detectingmobile replicas, and it is highly needed to overcome
these challenges by developing some new, different and more
efficient detection techniques for detectingmobile replicas or
clones.
7. Conclusion
This paper reviewed the state-of-the-art schemes for detec-
tion of node replication attack also called clone attack. The
existing techniques are broadly categorized into two classes
distributed and centralized. Both classes of schemes are
proficient in detecting and preventing clone attacks, but both
schemes also have some noteworthy drawbacks. However, to
sum up, the current study highlights the fact that there are
still a lot of challenges and issues in clone detection schemes
that need to be resolved to become more applicable to real-
life situations and also to become accepted by the resource
constrained sensor node.
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